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Abstract For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against
internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epis-
temologists have thought that Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conserva-
tism (PC) can split the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued,
however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his
dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and his reasons
for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that he is mistaken: PC can indeed
split its horns.
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1 Introduction
Few epistemic principles in recent memory have generated as much interest and
controversy as Michael Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism:
(PC): If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least
some degree of justification for believing that p. (Huemer 2007: 30)
As such, it has been the target of several objections. Some worry that PC must be
false because it implies that even crazy seemings or appearances can justify (Markie
2005: 357; Littlejohn 2011; Tooley 2013). Other philosophers fear that without a meta-
justification for thinking that one’s seemings are reliable—i.e., a justification for one’s
justification—PC must be mistaken (BonJour 2004: 357–360; Steup 2013). And still
others have worried that because one’s seemings can be cognitively penetrated by
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wishful thinking and irrational beliefs and desires, surely not all seemings provide
prima facie justification (Markie 2006: 119–120; Lyons 2011; McGrath 2013; Siegel
2013). In my view however, each of these challenges has been met with plausible
replies by advocates of Phenomenal Conservatism. 1 Yet there is one very serious
challenge to PC that has not been met head-on. In this paper, I will consider what is
perhaps the most important recent objection to internalism generally and conservative
principles like PC more specifically: Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism.
Bergmann has urged a dilemma against all internalist theories of epistemic justifi-
cation (Bergmann 2006) and against Phenomenal Conservatism in particular
(Bergmann 2013). In essence, Bergmann has argued that all internalist theories of
justification either end in regress and skepticism or else are unmotivated. Michael
Huemer has not directly responded to Bergmann’s challenge.2 So I will attempt to
respond on his behalf. First, I set the broader context by explicating the nature of
Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism. Second, I explain Bergmann’s specific applica-
tion of his dilemma for internalism to Phenomenal Conservatism. Third, I suggest what
I deem to be plausible replies to Bergmann’s arguments against both weak and strong
versions of PC. In short, I will argue that PC can indeed split the horns of Bergmann’s
dilemma. I close with a reflection on the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and its
prospects for success even if my counter-arguments are unsuccessful.
2 Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism
It must be said up front that defining internalism and externalism has led to no small
controversy in recent epistemology. But as Bergmann understands internalism, it is a
position requiring an awareness condition on justification. As he puts it, internalism is
the thesis that, Bin order for a person’s belief to be epistemically justified, it is not
enough that it has certain virtues (such as being in accord with the evidence or being
caused by the fact that makes it true); in addition, that person must be in some sense
aware of those virtues^ (Bergmann 2006: 3). This awareness, however, need not be
actual. Potential awareness—awareness that one is able to gain by armchair reflection
alone—is also acceptable on many internalist accounts. Thus, what most kinds of
internalism seem to have in common, thinks Bergmann (2006: 9), is that a subject
must be at least potentially aware of something contributing to her justification in order
for her belief to be justified. Specifically, Bergmann conceives of this necessary
condition of awareness in the following way:
The Awareness Requirement: S’s belief is justified only if (i) there is something,
X, that contributes to the justification of B—e.g., evidence for B or a truth
indicator for B or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s
justification—and (ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X. (Bergmann 2006:
9; cf. 2006: 55–57)
1 For a short and recent summary of replies to these challenges, see Huemer (2013b).
2 When the opportunity arose, Huemer had very little to say (Huemer 2013a: 336–337).
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Some prominent internalists would likely dispute the idea that an awareness require-
ment is an essential feature of internalism (e.g., Conee and Feldman 2004). 3 Still,
Bergmann’s understanding of internalism does capture the heart of what many prom-
inent internalists like Laurence Bonjour (BonJour and Sosa 2003: 24) see as distinctive
about internalism.
At this point, Bergmann offers a dilemma for internalism—one which clearly
parallels the Sellarsian dilemma for foundationalism (Sellars 1963, 1975; cf. BonJour
1978, 1985). Internalism comes in two main varieties: strong and weak, depending on
the strength of awareness that the internalist requires for justified belief. Regardless of
which kind of awareness the internalist adopts, Bergmann argues, problems arise.
Simply put, strong internalism leads to a vicious regress because of a meta-level
awareness requirement, and weak internalism cannot meet its own criteria of success
and hence is unmotivated. Bergmann (2006: 13–14) formalizes his argument against
internalism as follows:
(I) An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject’s actual or potential
awareness of some justification-contributor a necessary condition for the justifi-
cation of any belief held by that subject.
(II) The awareness required by internalism is either strong awareness or weak
awareness.
(III) If the awareness required by internalism is strong awareness, then internalism has
vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism.
(IV) If the awareness required by internalism is weak awareness, then internalism is
vulnerable to the SPO [Subject’s Perspective Objection], in which case
internalism loses its main motivation for imposing the awareness requirement.
(V) If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation for
imposing the awareness requirement (i.e., avoiding the SPO), then we should not
endorse internalism.
(VI) Therefore, we should not endorse internalism.
In defense of premise (V), Bergmann argues that other attempts to motivate
internalism fail—a claim to which we will return.4 But if that is the case, the key
premises needing defense are those constituting the heart of the dilemma, namely
premises (III) and (IV).
Let us begin with the strong awareness requirement and Bergmann’s defense of
premise (III). Strong awareness Bis awareness that involves conceiving of the
justification-contributor that is the object of awareness as being in some way relevant
to the truth or justification of the relevant belief^ (Bergmann 2006: 14). This strong
awareness comes in both doxastic and non-doxastic versions. Doxastic strong aware-
ness is Bawareness that involves the belief that the object of awareness is in some way
relevant to the truth or justification of the relevant belief^ (Bergmann 2006: 14). The
3 In fact, it should be noted that several prominent internalists reject access requirements. See, for example,
Fumerton (1995: 81) and other direct acquaintance theorists. For different but relevant understandings of
internalism, see Fumerton (1995: 60–66) and Huemer (2011b: 11).
4 Chapter four of Bergmann (2006) argues against a positive, deontological motivation for internalism, while
chapters seven and eight consider criticisms of externalism other than the SPO which might be considered as
negative motivations for internalism.
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problem, according to Bergmann, is that this belief that the object of awareness is in
some way relevant must itself be justified; otherwise, there is no point in requiring the
belief at all (Bergmann 2006: 15). But, this creates a vicious regress (Bergmann 2006;
Steup 2013). Once this meta-requirement is in place, the need for a justified meta-meta-
belief and a justified meta-meta-meta-belief arises. Unless one opts for infinitism about
beliefs, this requirement seems untenable (Bergmann 2006: 14–16). One might try to
escape this conclusion by claiming that S need only be potentially able to justifiably
believe that the justifier in question justifies S’s original belief. But Bergmann (2006:
16–19) argues that this view ends in vicious regress as well, since it requires the
potential for an infinite number of beliefs of ever-increasing complexity.5
As mentioned above, Bergmann (2006: 17–19) also considers non-doxastic versions
of strong awareness where S conceives of the justifier as a justifier but has no beliefs
about the justifier being justified. Non-doxastic strong awareness could also come in
actual and potential varieties depending on whether S justifiably but non-doxastically
conceives that the justifier justifies or whether S only has the ability to so justifiably
conceive. Bergmann thinks both routes also end in vicious regress. Non-doxastic strong
awareness, he argues, will require either the actual or potential application of an infinite
number of concepts.
Weak internalism, on the other hand, avoids the regress problem only to create
another, according to Bergmann. This problem constitutes the second horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism. Rather than require a meta-belief about one’s
reason to believe that p (or a meta-concept application), weak internalism only requires
an awareness of the reason for believing that p. This awareness can take many forms,
but the hallmark of weak awareness is that it does not require conceiving of the justifier
as a justifier. For this very reason, however, in defense of premise (IV), Bergmann
maintains that weak internalism is too weak to motivate internalism. It falls prey to a
common objection internalists often make against externalism.
Bergmann (2006: 11–12) asks us to reconsider BonJour’s famous argument against
reliabilist versions of externalism from Norman the clairvoyant. BonJour writes:
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a
cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact, the belief is true and results
from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely
reliable. (BonJour 1985: 41)
The lesson, of course, is supposed to be that (contra reliabilism) Norman clearly
lacks justification for his reliable clairvoyant beliefs. Making this point explicit,
BonJour tells us that the problem is that, from Norman’s own perspective, the fact that
5 Crisp (2010) argues that the meta-beliefs do not actually increase in complexity. For this reason, he
concludes that Bergmann has given no reason to think the regress induced is actually vicious. Hence,
Bergmann’s premise (III) above is unmotivated. One need only have the potential to believe one of these
meta-beliefs to be justified; and this, he claims, is fully possible. For a critical reply to Crisp, see DePoe (2012:
414–416).
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Norman’s belief is true is Ban accident.^ Sure, an external observer might see that
Norman’s belief is not an accident but results from a reliable cognitive faculty. Yet,
BonJour wonders, Bhow is this supposed to justify Norman’s belief?^ After all, from
Norman’s own perspective, the belief surely is accidentally true, and Bthe rationality or
justifiability of Norman’s belief should be judged from Norman’s own perspective
rather than from one which is unavailable to him^ (BonJour 1985: 43–44; cf. BonJour
and Sosa 2003: 27–32).6
In BonJour’s argument, Bergmann (2006: 12) sees the following internalist objec-
tion to externalism:
The Subject’s Perspective Objection: If the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of
what that belief has going for it, then she isn’t aware of how its status is any
different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may
conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And
that implies that it isn’t a justified belief.
The problem, according to Bergmann, is that weak internalism cannot itself satisfy
this widespread conviction of internalists; weak internalism is subject to the SPO.
Norman the clairvoyant has a reason for his true belief that the president is in NYC, yet
he is still not justified because the truth of his belief is Baccidental^ in some sense. But
without a meta-requirement like that found in strong internalism (which requires that
the subject be aware of her reason for believing that p qua reason), Bergmann argues
that many ordinary beliefs will be accidental when considered from a subjective
perspective. If this is correct, having an undefeated reason for believing that p is
insufficient for doxastic justification.
To better see the problem for weak internalism, consider the form of what Matthias
Steup (2013: 140) dubs BBergmann Cases^ (i.e., cases where weak internalism does
not meet the SPO).
(i) S has a true belief that p.
(ii) S has a reason r for p.
(iii) S does not have any form of justified meta-belief with the content that r is a
source of justification for his belief that p.
(iv) Because of (iii), the truth of S’s belief must, from within S’s perspective, be
considered accidental.
(v) Because of (iv), S’s belief fails to be justified by the very standards internalists
themselves endorse.
Here, S has a reason r1 for believing that p but not a reason r2 for believing r1 to
justify his belief that p. The idea is that by meeting (i)–(iii), S is justified according to
weak internalism, but in reality, S is surely unjustified according to a common criteria
(the SPO) which internalists typically urge against externalists. If such cases are
possible, weak internalism cannot meet internalism’s own standard for success.
6 As Bergmann notes, this sort of awareness requirement is seen in several other internalists as well (e.g.,
Lehrer 1990: 162; Moser 1985: 129).
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3 PC to the Rescue?
It has seemed to some advocates of Phenomenal Conservatism that PC can escape
Bergmann’s dilemma. After all, PC does not require any sort of meta-belief for justification.
Recall that according to Huemer’s current formulation, it only states the following:
(PC): If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least
some degree of justification for believing that p. (Huemer 2007: 30)
As others have explained, a seeming is an experience of a special sort—one that has
propositional content and a distinctive phenomenal character which has Bthe feel of
truth^ (Tolhurst 1998: 298; cf. Huemer 2001: 77–79; Gage 2014: 27–32). One might
easily think that PC escapes the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma: it gives an internalist
notion of justification which neither leads to regress (through requiring a meta-belief)
nor seems accidental from the subject’s point of view, rooted as it is in the way the
world seems to the subject.
Bergmann, however, argues that PC also falls prey to his dilemma. It is this
contention that I wish to dispute in the remainder of this paper. But first we must see
why Bergmann thinks that PC cannot avoid his dilemma for internalism. Bergmann
begins by pressing on Huemer’s definition of PC. He argues that if Huemer intends PC
to be an internalist notion of justification (i.e., one which excludes externalism), then he
must really have in mind the view that S’s belief that p is doxastically justified if and
only if the belief is based on S’s seeming that p (Bergmann 2013: 154–155). This seems
fair enough since at times Huemer (e.g., Huemer 2001: 109) suggests that PC is the
only viable principle of non-inferential justification. Just think of Huemer’s self-defeat
argument (Huemer 2001: 107–108; Huemer 2007: 39–41; Huemer 2011a, b). He
argues that ultimately only seemings can justify. Huemer (2006: 148) also endorses
the Bappearance account^ of internalism which maintains that Ball of the conditions that
confer justification supervene on how things seem to the subject.^ Hence, it seems
likely that he would endorse the stronger, internalist ‘if and only if’ principle.
Given this specifically internalist notion of PC, Bergmann distinguishes two possible
formulations of internalist Phenomenal Conservatism (IPC) depending on the sort of
awareness requirement they place on PC. IPC might claim that S must conceive of S’s
seeming as in some way relevant to the truth or justification of the belief (strong
version), or it might not (weak version). Hence, he distinguishes these two possible
versions of IPC with the ultimate aim of showing that both fall victim to the two horns
of his more general dilemma for internalism. The strong version is as follows:
(IPCS): S’s belief that p is prima facie justified only if (1) it seems to S that p, (2) S
is aware of this seeming (i.e., it is a conscious seeming7), and (3) S conceives of
this seeming that p as being in some way relevant to the truth or justification of
the belief that p. (Bergmann 2013: 164)
7 On Bergmann’s inclusion of the word Bconscious^ here, see Bergmann (2013: 160–162). By a conscious
seeming, he just means a seeming that is within your first-person perspective. You need not be aware that you
are having a seeming to have a conscious seeming; you need only be aware of the seeming from the inside, so
to speak. In what follows, I just assume that all seemings are conscious since I am unsure what an unconscious
seeming is.
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The weak version, however, requires no such conceiving of the seeming as relevant
to the truth or justification of the belief.
(IPCW): S’s belief that p is prima facie justified only if (1) it seems to S that p and
(2) S is aware of this seeming (i.e., it is a conscious seeming); it is not necessary
that (3) S conceives of this seeming that p as being in some way relevant to the
truth or justification of the belief that p. (Bergmann 2013: 163)
Here, we have PC instantiations of Bergmann’s original targets: strong and weak
internalism. With these two versions of internalist PC clarified, Bergmann argues that
PC is bound to fall prey to his general dilemma against internalism. In what follows, I
consider and evaluate his arguments that both IPCS and IPCW cannot meet this
challenge.
4 PC and Bergmann’s Dilemma, Part I: IPCS
Put most simply, the problem facing advocates of the strong version—i.e., those who
advocate clause (3) of IPCS—is this: They must either think that (a) the subject’s
conceiving must itself be justified, or they must think that (b) this conceiving need not
be justified (Bergmann 2013: 164). If they do think it must be justified, then Bergmann
argues that they end up in an infinite regress just like those who require a meta-belief
about one’s justification—for their judgment that their conceiving is justified must be
justified and so on. But if IPCS’s advocates claim that the conceiving involved does not
itself need to be justified, then why think that this conceiving is a necessary condition
on justification? After all, Bergmann asks, what could it possibly contribute to the
justification of the target belief if it is not itself justified?
Let us consider option (a) first. Bergmann’s concern here is that if only seemings can
justify, then in order for a given belief to be doxastically justified, it must be the case
that (i) S has a seeming that p, (ii) this seeming is conscious, (iii) S conceives of the
seeming that p as relevant to the justification of S’s belief that p, and (iv) S is justified in
step (iii)—that is, S is justified in conceiving of the seeming that p as relevant to the
belief that p. In order for step (iii) to be justified, Bergmann says, one must apply a
concept like Bbeing relevant^ to the seeming. But if that concept application is itself to
be justified, then it too needs a seeming. An infinite regress is created because, on this
view, if a seeming is to be useful in justifying a belief, then it needs a concept
application; and each concept application needs a seeming to justify it (Bergmann
2013: 164–166). So, seeming S1 needs concept application A1. But then concept
application A1 needs another seeming S2. But then one needs concept application A2
in order to be justified in connecting S2 to A1, etc., etc. While I will not do so in this
paper, it is worth noting that some have challenged the notion that the ensuing regress is
vicious (Rogers and Matheson 2011; Crisp 2010; Fales 2014).8
More interesting for my purposes is interpretation (b) of the strong version of IPC.
Recall that this version agrees that the subject must somehow conceive of her seeming
8 Bergmann (2006: 38–43) replies to Fales’s (1996) argument that the regress here is not vicious. Fales (2014)
extends this debate.
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that p as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that p, but crucially, this
conceiving itself need not be justified. Bergmann (2013: 164) thinks that it is simply
implausible to think that a conception which is not itself justified is somehow a
necessary condition for doxastic justification. After all, what could this conceiving
possibly contribute to a belief’s justification if it is not itself justified? Say that S
satisfies clauses (1) and (2) of IPCS. That is, suppose S has a conscious seeming that p.
Bergmann notes that S could then meet clause (3) of IPCS simply by incorrectly (or
even irrationally) conceiving of the seeming that p as relevant to the justification of her
belief. If (1) and (2) are not sufficient for doxastic justification, what could a mistaken
(or even crazy) concept application add such that the belief is then doxastically justified
(Bergmann 2013: 166)?
In my view, the advocate of IPCS should not be troubled by this objection. To
answer this worry, we must show that conceiving of a seeming that p as relevant to the
justification of the target belief can plausibly contribute something to the justification of
the belief that p—and, furthermore, that it can do so without falling victim to a vicious
regress.9 Given the above argument and others from Bergmann (e.g., 2005: 431, 2006:
15), it is reasonable to think that his leading intuition is that if this concept application
cannot add anything to what is known as Bthe truth connection^ (cf. Cohen 1984;
BonJour 1985: 7–8; Bergmann 2006: 141–143)—i.e., to the likely truth of the belief in
question—then such a concept application adds nothing to a belief’s justification. That
is, if x fails to add anything to the truth connection—i.e., if x fails to make it more likely
that the target proposition is true—then it would be absurd to think that it is a necessary
condition on justification.
So, to repeat Bergmann’s challenge to interpretation (b) of IPCS: If clauses (1) and
(2) are not sufficient for doxastic justification, what could a mistaken (or even crazy)
concept application add such that the belief is then doxastically justified? Well, without
doubt, such a mistaken concept application does not add to the truth connection. Yet
even if securing the truth connection is necessary for justification, surely securing the
truth connection is not the only purpose of a condition on justification. As Chris Tucker
(2012: 328) reminds us, the basing relation is a widely accepted necessary condition on
justification that does not strengthen the truth connection: BBasing a belief in P on a
belief in E contributes to the…justification of my belief in P, not because it makes the
belief more likely to be true, but because it constitutes, at least in part, the required
mental connection between my belief in E and my belief in P.^ So, a necessary
condition on justification like the basing relation, then, might help us secure the
required mental connection for justification—a connection, roughly, which relates one’s
evidence to one’s belief. To illustrate the need for such a mental connection, consider
two cases from Fumerton (2004a: 154) in which a subject infers a new belief p from
some evidence e (where e entails p). In the first case, S1 ‘sees’ that e logically entails p.
In the second case, S2 is caused to believe p as a result of believing e and yet does not
see how e entails p (perhaps it is a very complicated inference). Few of us, I think,
would judge S2’s belief that p epistemically justified. S2 simply lacks the right sort of
mental connection between his evidence and his belief.
Return now to Bergmann’s line of reasoning. Perhaps Bergmann is right that a
wildly inaccurate concept application adds nothing to the truth connection. But as we
9 In what follows, I follow Tucker (2012) on a number of points.
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have just seen, there is no reason to think that condition (3) of ICPS—i.e., that
S must conceive of this seeming that p as being in some way relevant to the
truth or justification of the belief that p—can be a necessary condition on
justification only if it contributes to the likely truth of p. A concept application
which appears correct from the subject’s perspective (even if it is mistaken)
adds something important to one’s justification by securing a mental connection
such that the justification contributor and the belief are appropriately connected.
The advocate of interpretation (b) of ICPS could, then, reasonably maintain that
justification requires a conscious seeming that p plus a higher-order conception
of her seeming that p as being relevant to the justification or truth of her belief
that p (regardless of whether this conception is itself justified). After all, even a
mistaken concept application might secure this mental connection. Further, the
advocate of interpretation (b) of IPCS does not fall prey to a vicious regress.
This regress was only generated by assuming that the conceiving of the
seeming as relevant to the belief must be justified. But interpretation (b) of
IPCS does not assume this in the first place. If this is correct, then Bergmann
has given no reason to dissuade the advocate of IPCS that such a requirement
like (3) is necessary.
5 PC and Bergmann’s Dilemma, Part II: IPCW
But even if the foregoing reply to Bergmann regarding IPCS is correct, Bergmann’s
dilemma might still have great force. After all, as Bergmann (2013: 167) himself
notes—and I concur—most advocates of PC are unlikely to be dismayed by his
argument against IPCS since Bthey have never been particularly enamored with
higher-level requirements such as clause (3)^ of IPCS. For this reason, he focuses most
of his attention on IPCW. Just as with other versions of weak internalism, Bergmann
argues that IPCW, given its weak awareness requirement, will fall victim to the SPO. If
this is correct, Bergmann continues, the motivation for internalist PC will be
undermined, as the SPO was the main motivation for internalism in the first place.
Therefore, IPCW should not be endorsed.
Let us examine this argument in more detail. The SPO is meant to be an objection to
externalism and hence a (negative) motivation for internalism. It is meant to show that
even if a belief has something going for it—say, it is reliably formed or produced by
properly functioning faculties—this is still not enough for the belief to be justified.
Something more than externalist virtue is needed for epistemic justification. Bergmann
(2013: 168) describes the heart of the SPO as follows:
(SPO): If the believing subject isn’t aware of what her belief has going for it, then
from her perspective, it is an accident that the belief is true, in which case the
belief isn’t justified. (cf. BonJour 1985: 42–44; Bergmann 2006: 11–12)
But, what exactly does it mean for a belief to be an accident from the subject’s
perspective? In his earlier work, Bergmann (2006) did not attempt an analysis. But
more recently Bergmann (2013: 168–170) considers four possibilities before settling on
the following notion:
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(Accident V) It’s false that it’s an accident from S’s perspective that her belief B is
true iff: S is aware of X and S believes that X indicates B’s truth (or at least
conceives of X as being relevant to B’s truth or justification). (Bergmann 2013:
168)
Bergmann (2013: 169) thinks this interpretation of what it means to be an accident
from the subject’s perspective is best in that if you satisfy Accident V, then the target
belief is clearly not an accident from the subject’s perspective, while on other accounts,
this is not the case; so the SPO is best interpreted with Accident V’s understanding of
accidentality in mind. The problem with BonJour’s Norman, in this view, is that
Norman is either not aware of something X which indicates the truth of his belief
and/or Norman does not believe that X is (or at least conceive of X as) relevant to the
truth of his belief.
We will return to this issue shortly. But with this view of the SPO in mind, we can
now see why Bergmann thinks IPCW cannot escape his dilemma for internalism: IPCW
is simply unable to avoid the SPO. As a result, it is unmotivated and hence should not
be believed. To see this, recall that according to IPCW all that doxastic justification for
the belief that p requires is that S has a conscious seeming that p. It is not required that S
conceive of this seeming that p as relevant to the truth or justification of S’s belief that
p. Bergmann (2013: 170) rightly notes that the question before us is this: Can S have a
conscious seeming that p while at the same time the truth of p is an accident from S’s
perspective?
Bergmann thinks that the answer is surely ‘yes.’ He imagines situations in which S
has an objectively good reason to believe that p, and does indeed believe that p, but S
does not recognize the good reason to believe that p as a good reason to believe that p.
For instance, Bergmann (2013: 170) says, one might have pains that are indicative of a
heart attack; believe that one is having a heart attack; and yet believe that one is having
a heart attack for silly reasons (e.g., one just heard Enrique Iglesias’s song BHeart
Attack^ on the radio). So, what is the problem here? Well, the truth of the belief that p
seems accidental from S’s perspective (i.e., given the reasons for which S actually
believes that p).
So Bergmann thinks that it is surely possible for S to have a conscious seeming
that p while at the same time the truth of p is an accident from S’s perspective. As
another example, imagine that Sam, because of some severe cognitive malfunction,
cannot see the connections in modus ponens. In such a case, Sam might believe that
p, believe that p entails q, and believe that q without basing the belief that q on the
relevant propositions and modus ponens. In the same way, Bergmann (2013: 171–
172) thinks, Bit is possible to hold the belief that p for a silly reason and at the same
time to be aware of the seeming that p, all the while (because of severe malfunction)
not recognizing any connection between the seeming that p and the truth of the
belief that p.^
But if this is possible, then Bthe believer will have a conscious seeming that p and
yet it will be an accident from that person’s perspective that her belief that p is true^
(Bergmann 2013: 172). So if Bergmann is right, it is indeed possible to have a
conscious seeming that p and, at the same time, for one’s belief that p to be only
accidentally true from one’s own perspective. And if this is possible, then IPCW is too
weak to avoid the SPO. As the whole point of internalism in Bergmann’s view was to
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posit the need for an awareness requirement on justification and hence avoid the SPO,
the fact that IPCW cannot itself avoid the SPO is a major problem. If the point of
rejecting externalist theories of justification was because the beliefs fall prey to the
SPO—i.e., externally justified beliefs can be accidental from the subject’s perspec-
tive—then the advocate of IPCW has just as good of a reason to reject IPCW as to reject
externalism. In this regard, IPCW is simply unmotivated.
In reply, however, Bergmann’s critique of IPCW depends crucially on the way he has
formulated IPCS and IPCW. Recall that PC is actually a principle of propositional
justification. In order to show that PC falls prey to his dilemma for internalism,
Bergmann had to transform PC into a principle of doxastic justification. That is fair
enough. But note that for most internalists—Huemer (2011a: 1) included—doxastic
justification is simply a function of propositional justification plus proper basing (i.e.,
the belief that p must actually be based upon one’s propositional justification for p).10
But when Bergmann translates PC into its supposedly doxastic versions in IPCW and
IPCS, he fails to include a basing clause. It is possible that Bergmann took clause (3) of
IPCS to be sufficient for basing, but surely it is not. That is, conceiving of a seeming
that p as being relevant to the truth or justification of the belief that p is not sufficient for
basing the belief that p on the seeming that p. One could surely conceive of a seeming
that p as relevant but fail to have it enter into the evidence they actually use to support
their belief that p. Just think of Lehrer’s Gypsy Lawyer case (Lehrer 1971). A lawyer
reads tarot cards to determine whether his client is guilty. The cards ‘say’ that he is
guilty, so he goes out and finds evidence sufficient to conclude guilt. But the lawyer
only collects evidence because his job requires it; he does not actually care about the
evidence for epistemic reasons. He would believe with the cards and no evidence, and
he would disbelieve with the evidence and no cards. Even though the lawyer is aware
of the evidence and conceives of it as relevant to the proposition ‘my client is guilty,’ it
seems clear that the lawyer is epistemically defective precisely because he does not
base his belief in his client’s guilt on the actual evidence. So, clause (3) of IPCS is
insufficient for basing. But even if it were sufficient, IPCW would still not contain a
basing requirement. The point is this: Because neither IPCS nor IPCW includes a basing
clause, IPCS and IPCW do not accurately reflect an internalist PC view of doxastic
justification.
So let us include a basing clause in IPCW, get a more accurate view of the weak
version of internalist PC, and re-evaluate.
(IPCW2): S’s belief that p is prima facie justified only if (1) it seems to S that p and
(2) S is aware of this seeming (i.e., it is a conscious seeming); it is not necessary
that (3) S conceives of this seeming that p as being in some way relevant to the
truth or justification of the belief that p; and (4) S must base the belief that p upon
S’s seeming that p.
With this addition, it is clear that our hypothetical subject who severely malfunctions
such that he has the seeming that p but fails to base his belief that p on his seeming that
p has some degree of propositional justification according to PC but is doxastically
10 Some coherentists about justification, of course, will think that proper basing is not necessary for doxastic
justification.
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unjustified, according to our IPCW2. And this seems as it should be. If a subject has an
epistemic reason to believe that p (viz., it seems to the subject that p), then p has some
justification for that subject. But the subject’s belief that p might still be unjustified,
depending on the subject’s reason(s) for believing that p. To Bergmann’s larger point,
he is surely right that it is possible for S to have a seeming that p and at the same time
for S’s belief that p to be accidentally true. But, this is only because S’s belief that p
could be based upon bad evidence.
A quick aside: One might worry that by imposing a basing requirement IPCW2 can
no longer do the work required of it. That is to say, because many accounts of the
basing relation are doxastic and require that the subject believe that her evidence
supports her conclusion (Audi 1993: 233–273; Fumerton 2004b: 165; Leite 2008),
one might worry that IPCW2 cannot function as a solution to Bergmann’s dilemma.
After all, if IPCW2 contains a higher-level doxastic requirement, then it seems that it just
becomes a strong version of internalist PC and hence may fall victim to the first horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma. But by way of reply, note that the basing relation need not be
doxastic. I do not have space to defend the view here, but I suggest that the basing
requirement not be construed doxastically but in terms of a weaker requirement like S
takes evidence E to support the proposition p (cf. Tucker 2012). BTaking,^ is meant to
encompass even non-doxastic states like seemings (and perhaps direct acquaintance, if
it is construed as a non-doxastic state).11
Now let us return to the main point. Say that S has a conscious seeming that p and
believes that p on the basis of this seeming that p; that is, let us say that S meets the
conditions laid out in IPCW2. If p turns out to be true, is it only accidentally true from
S’s perspective? This will depend on how we construe Baccidentally true.^ Recall that
Bergmann (2013: 168) understands this notion as follows:
(Accident V) It’s false that it’s an accident from S’s perspective that her belief B is
true iff: S is aware of X and S believes that X indicates B’s truth (or at least
conceives of X as being relevant to B’s truth or justification).
Now if this is the only viable understanding of what it means for a proposition not to
be accidentally true from a subject’s perspective, then IPCW and IPCW2 are doomed to
failure from the start. After all, weak internalist PC just denies that S must conceive of
S’s seeming that p as relevant to the truth of S’s belief that p. But surely this is not the
only viable understanding of what it means for a belief to fail to be accidentally true
from a subject’s perspective. We need a conception that captures Bergmann’s (2006:
12) original intuition that an accidental belief is one that is no better than Ba stray hunch
or an arbitrary conviction.^ Rogers and Matheson (2011: 62) capture something of the
commonsense notion of what it means for a belief not to be accidentally true when they
write: BGiven that the proposition seems true to him, it is not surprising or accidental,
from his perspective, that it is true.^ The notion of ‘not being surprising’ is a good start.
But we might ask why the truth that p would be unsurprising to the subject. Well,
presumably this is because the subject has a positive reason to believe that p and no
defeaters, no outweighing evidence. I suggest, then, that we capture this notion as
follows:
11 Note that one can have a seeming that p and yet fail to believe that p because of counter-evidence that not-p.
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(Accident VI) It’s false that it’s an accident from S’s perspective that her belief
that p is true iff: S has an epistemic reason for her belief that p, bases her belief
that p on this epistemic reason, and has no believed defeaters for p.
The truth of the belief that p is not surprising to S because she has good reason to
believe that p (viz., p seems true) and no outweighing reasons against p. Surely then the
truth of p is neither surprising nor accidental from S’s perspective.
As a referee suggests, accident VI bears some resemblance to the first of the
principles Bergmann considers:
(Accident I) It’s false that it’s an accident from S’s perspective that her belief B is
true iff: S is aware of X and X in fact indicates B’s truth. (Bergmann 2013: 168)
Accident VI differs from Accident I, however, in focusing on epistemic reasons
rather than awareness and includes basing and no-defeater clauses. Bergmann (2013:
168–169) rejected Accident I because he worried that it is Bcompatible with both (a) S’s
not realizing that the specified condition is satisfied and (b) S’s believing that B is
formed in an unreliable way.^ Accident VI is subject to neither critique. Regarding (a),
Bergmann’s worry is that Ba thing, X, of which S is aware could indicate B’s truth
without S realizing it does^ (Bergmann 2013: 169). But Accident VI contains a basing
clause. If S possesses an epistemic reason for B and then bases her belief B on that
reason, then S clearly ‘takes’ her epistemic reason to indicate B’s truth. And concerning
(b), this is not an issue for Accident VI since it would constitute a believed defeater.
Hence, Bergmann’s concerns with Accident I do not apply to Accident VI.
To further see that Accident VI is indeed a good account, let us return to the case of
Norman the clairvoyant (quoted above) which spawned this discussion of accidentally
true beliefs. BonJour’s critique of externalism, recall, is that Norman’s belief is surely
unjustified since he has no reason from his own perspective to believe that the President
is in New York, even though Norman has a reliable clairvoyance mechanism. Accord-
ing to Accident VI, Norman’s belief will indeed be accidentally true from his own
perspective, given that BonJour (1985: 41) stipulated that Norman has no epistemic
reason or evidence on which he bases his belief. So, Accident VI appears to jive with
BonJour’s internalist intuition about accidentally true beliefs.
The larger point is this: If Accident VI is (as it appears to be) a good account of what
it means for a belief to fail to be accidentally true, then there seems no reason why
IPCW2 must fall prey to the SPO. If a subject meets the conditions of IPCW2, then the
subject has also fulfilled the conditions for accident VI and hence her belief will not be
accidentally true. For if one has a conscious seeming that p and bases her belief that p
on the seeming (per IPCW2), then one has an epistemic reason to believe that p upon
which the belief is based (and, we are presuming, no defeaters). Hence fulfilling
IPCW2’s conditions will fulfill Accident VI’s conditions. Consequently, IPCW2 does
not fall prey to the SPO.
Huemer (2013a: 337) dismissed Bergmann’s challenge from the SPO rather quickly;
he thinks that the SPO is simply false if it is interpreted in a positive manner. For
Huemer, the believing subject need not be aware of anything positive that the believed
proposition has going for it in order to be justified; the subject must only be unaware of
any defeaters. For him, the SPO is only true if it is posed as a negative requirement. But
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I have argued that the defender of PC need not deny the SPO. I have taken the SPO’s
claim that a subject must be Baware what a belief has going for it^ in a straightforward
manner as requiring that a subject must have positive epistemic reason(s) to believe the
target proposition. Seemings appear to provide epistemic reasons, and Bergmann has
not argued the contrary. 12 Given this, internalist PC escapes the SPO horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma.13
6 A Final Worry
I have attempted to show that Bergmann’s dilemma is unsuccessful against PC. In
particular, I have argued that PC can avoid the SPO horn of his dilemma. But even if
my argument here was unsuccessful, it is worth noting that the SPO horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma (see premise IV of Bergmann’s dilemma, above) is ultimately
about the internalist’s motivation. The dilemma claims that because the only viable
motivation for internalist PC is the SPO and internalist PC itself falls prey to the SPO,
the motivation for internalist PC is lost.
But, while Bergmann has admittedly argued at some length that the SPO is the only
good motivation for internalism (and hence the only good motivation for internalist
PC), it is not at all clear that the SPO is the only viable motivation for internalism. Peter
Markie (2009), for instance, has argued that while some of Bergmann’s (2006)
criticisms of leading motivations for internalism are successful, Bergmann still leaves
some versions of internalism well-motivated. And I concur. There are many internalists
who have sought to motivate internalism without invoking anything like the SPO.
Michael Huemer (2011a) himself, to take but one example, seeks to motivate
internalism with his self-defeat argument—a motivation quite independent of the SPO.
Now, it would be manifestly unfair to criticize Bergmann for having failed to refute
every possible motivation for internalism other than the SPO. But still, the claim on
which the second horn of the dilemma rests is that the SPO is the main motivation for
internalism. Consequently, if Huemer or others have plausible motivations for their
internalism beside the SPO, then Bergmann’s dilemma will fail even if I have been
incorrect in arguing that PC can meet the challenge of the SPO.
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